May 4, 2023

Researching Android's behavior during Internet shutdowns


The Briar team is currently doing some research into the long-term evolution of the project. We have two main branches of research, which we refer to as “social mesh” and “public mesh” respectively.

The social mesh part of our research is concerned with routing messages within a social graph of established and trusted contacts. The public mesh part is concerned with routing messages via untrusted devices. The overarching goal is to find suitable mechanisms and concepts for improving Briar’s messaging capabilities, especially in situations where Internet access is unavailable, such as during an Internet shutdown.

Simulated Internet shutdowns

One aspect of our public mesh research is looking into how Android devices behave in case of an Internet shutdown. While it is clear that during a full or partial Internet shutdown, many websites and services cannot be reached from any device, it is not so clear which functionality remains intact. The Android operating system has mechanisms to detect whether a device has a working Internet connection, and we wanted to find out whether this assessment might prevent installed apps from communicating with servers that were technically still reachable.

To get insight into this, we decided to simulate Internet shutdowns on a wireless network using different techniques, and to observe how Android devices reacted while connected to that Wi-Fi.

The experiments showed that it is relatively simple to simulate a partial Internet shutdown where Android thinks the Internet connection is not working, but this does not seem to prevent any non-blocked Internet traffic. The operating system and the browser give strong visual indications to the user that the current Wi-Fi network doesn’t provide Internet access, but the browser and other apps just keep working nonetheless.

This is good news for apps like Briar that are designed to operate during Internet shutdowns, making use of whatever network connectivity is available.

Experiment setup

The basic setup for our experiments was a Linux-based Wi-Fi router that was configured in different ways to simulate an Internet shutdown. A phone running Android 11 was used for testing. The idea was to block just enough of the network to make Android think the Internet connection was broken, and then test whether apps could still use the network.

We already knew that a special domain name was used for checking Internet connectivity: Android uses this domain to test whether the phone is connected to a Wi-Fi network with a so-called captive portal, where the user needs to accept some terms and conditions before gaining Internet access. We manipulated the DNS server to behave in different ways for that special domain name and created four distinct situations:

  1. Install a fake captive portal reachable at
  2. No captive portal, instead configure the DNS server to behave irregularly for and some more of Google’s domains:
    • a) return unused IP addresses,
    • b) return DNS error responses,
    • c) do not return DNS responses at all.

A combination of dnsmasq, nginx and iptables was used to set up these situations.

1. Fake captive portal

If you’ve used an Android phone on a public Wi-Fi network, you’re probably familiar with the basic situation created by setup 1). Right after establishing a connection to the Wi-Fi, Android shows a notification telling you that you’re required to sign in to the network in order to use it. The wireless connections settings screen shows a similar message. In addition, the Wi-Fi symbol in the status bar has a small “X” in the corner, as a hint that the network does not provide Internet access. Tapping the notification opens a browser window that usually displays the captive portal, prompting you to enter a token or simply accept some terms and conditions.

We didn’t simulate a full-blown captive portal, just returned an unexpected HTTP response code for the relevant endpoint, Usually, a router would block other network traffic until the user had completed the required confirmation steps in the captive portal. In our case, all network traffic was still possible as far as the router was concerned. We used the Chrome browser to check network access to other websites. Even though the browser showed a black bar at the top saying “No Internet connection”, we were able to browse random sites just fine.

2. Manipulating DNS responses for some of Google’s domains

Setup 2) was different from the first one in that Android was unable to connect to and receive any HTTP response at all.

For case a), dnsmasq was configured to return a local IP address for that domain name. We knew this address was not in use at the time, so Android could not connect to an HTTP server at that address. For case b), dnsmasq was configured to return an NXDOMAIN response instead, so Android would know immediately that the address lookup had failed. For case c), iptables was configured to silently drop the relevant DNS requests.

In all three cases, Android didn’t report that the Wi-Fi connection was broken, in contrast to setup 1).

Inspecting DNS traffic on the network, we were able to observe that other domains were queried without any user interaction: and Extending the scenarios to block these domains in addition to the connectivity check did cause Android to report that the the Wi-Fi connection was broken. The small “X” on the status bar icon appeared, the Wi-Fi settings screen showed “No Internet” for the current network, and Chrome had the additional black bar at the top saying “No Internet connection”.

Unlike setup 1), there was no prompt to sign into the network. This makes sense, as Android was not able to reach the captive portal.

As in the first setup, we used Chrome to check random websites. Except for Google, which was really blocked in this setup, we had no problems browsing the web.


When an Android device thinks that its Internet connection doesn’t work, either due to a captive portal or due to certain Google domains being unreachable, apps on the device are still able to connect to IP addresses that remain reachable, and the device can still resolve DNS queries for other domains. Even though various parts of the UI indicate that the system considers the Wi-Fi connection to be offline, the system does not seem to block any traffic as a result of this assessment.

For our project, this is good news: it means that even when access to the global Internet is blocked, it should still be possible to communicate with other devices on local networks or national subsets of the Internet. While other mechanisms could still influence the ability to form mesh networks, the Android operating system itself doesn’t seem to get in our way.


This experiment was part of ongoing research funded by eQualitie.

About Briar

Briar is a messaging app designed for activists, journalists, and anyone else who needs a safe, easy and robust way to communicate. Unlike traditional messaging tools such as email, Twitter or Telegram, Briar doesn’t rely on a central server - messages are synchronized directly between the users’ devices. If the internet’s down, Briar can sync via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, keeping the information flowing in a crisis. If the internet’s up, Briar can sync via the Tor network, protecting users and their relationships from surveillance.

Briar has received funding from the Small Media Foundation, the Open Internet Tools Project, Access Now, the Open Technology Fund, the Prototype Fund, Internews, the NLnet Foundation, the Next Generation Internet programme, the ISC Project and


Torsten Grote <> [PGP key]

Michael Rogers <> [PGP key]

Twitter: @BriarApp

Mastodon: @Briar